The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant

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  • Rachel McKinnon?
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Administration-level changes are especially important. They set the tone for students and employees. They also carry a lot of force, impacting the whole institution rather than just a department. First and foremost, it is paramount that university administrators put into place robust institutional human-rights policies that explicitly protect people from discrimination and harassment based on gender identity and gender expression.

A Critique of Turri's Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions | Diametros

The latter protects more than just transgender persons. Gender identity refers to the gender that a person is, regardless of what they were assigned at birth. Gender expression refers to the various ways that we show or signal our gender to others: our clothes, mannerisms, makeup, hair and so on. Thus, we want robust policy protections so that she can do this while free from harassment or discrimination. That the College of Charleston has explicit antidiscrimination and antiharassment policies including gender identity and expression was a significant part of my accepting the position.

So I especially applaud them on this, and I recommend their policy as one to emulate. Second, administrations need to have a posted policy on gender identity and expression and bathroom use. In many jurisdictions in the United States and Canada, people are legally — and certainly morally — permitted to use whatever bathroom best matches their gender identity. This choice is up to the people themselves, and no individual or organization should police gender.

And this decision may change over time during their transition: early on, they may not feel comfortable changing the bathrooms they use, but later on, they might. Increasingly in the United States, the departments of Justice, Education and Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have all adopted trans-inclusive policies and directives. Let me say that this fear is unfounded and deeply stigmatizing.

Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant

In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some Feminist Epistemology in Epistemology.

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Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the MOA Became Extinct

This article proposes a new account of luck and how luck impacts attributions of credit for agents' actions. It proposes an analogy with the expected value of a series of wagers and argues that luck is the difference between actual outcomes and expected value. The upshot of the argument is that when considering the interplay of intention, chance, outcomes, skill, and actions, we ought to be more parsimonious in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill and obtaining successful outcomes, Furthermore, the article argues that when agents skillfully perform an action, they deserve the same amount of credit whether their action is successful or unsuccessful in achieving the goal.

Epistemic Luck in Epistemology.

  1. Animal Models of Spinal Cord Repair.
  2. Islands Off the Coast of Capitola, 1978.
  3. Assertion and Its Many Norms.
  4. Direct download 6 more. This essay takes up two questions. First, what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck? At least colloquially speaking, luck is conceived as something out of an agent's control. So how could an agent increase or decrease the likelihood that she'll be lucky?

    Building on some recent work on the metaphysics of luck, the essay argues that there is a sense in which agents can create their own luck because people with more skill tend to have Second, what implications does this conception of luck have for related topics such as how we evaluate performances like shooting an arrow , including coming to know something? The ubiquitous presence of luck in our actions is often underappreciated. The essay argues that when we combine an expected outcomes view of luck with a counterfactual view of causation, the distinction between environmental and intervening veritic luck seems to disappear.

    We need a more nuanced view of how luck sometimes undermines credit for success in agents' actions.

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    The upshot of this view is that while luck may undermine the creditworthiness of an agent's success, it only partially undermines creditworthiness. Counterfactual Theories of Causation in Metaphysics. Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology. Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts.

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    Consequently, I argue that reasons-based norms can equally well explain this data. It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge ISHK are unwarranted.

    I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish Practical and Theoretical Reasoning in Philosophy of Action. The primary support for KAA is an explanatory inference from a broad range of linguistic data. The more data that KAA well explains, the stronger the case for it, and the more difficult it is for the competition to keep pace. In this paper we critically assess a purported new linguistic datum, which, it has We argue that KAA does not well explain it.

    Epistemic Norms in Epistemology.

    The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. This paper is composed of two projects. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory , that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery Cet article se compose de deux projets. Knowledge in Epistemology.

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    Theories of Knowledge in Epistemology. Political Ethics in Applied Ethics. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.

    As Williamson puts it, asserting something false is likened to cheating at the game of assertion. Most writers on the topic have consequently proposed factive norms of assertion — ones on which truth is a necessary condition for the proper performance of an assertion. However, I argue that this view is mistaken. I suggest that we can illuminate the error by introducing a In light of this distinction, we can see that proponents of factive norms tend to mistake the goal of a practice for the norm.

    In making my case, I present an analogy between the norms and goals of placing wagers and the norms and goals of assertion. One may place a bet and lose without being subject to criticism, while one may win and be worthy of criticism. Whether one wins or loses is irrelevant to the normative evaluation of a bet.

    What is relevant is whether the bet maximizes the bettor's expected value, which is a function of what might be lost, what might be gained, and how likely those prospects are, given the bettor's evidence. Similarly, I argue, whether one's assertion is true or false is not strictly relevant to the normative evaluation of an assertion. What is relevant is whether the speaker has adequate supporting reasons for the assertion, and that the necessary conventional and pragmatic features are present.

    However, context will determine what count as supportive reasons for a given proposition, what counts as relevant, and what count as conventional and pragmatic elements possessing that relevance. My proposed norm, the Supportive Reasons Norm, is thus sensitive to the context of assertion and shifts from context to context.

    The Norms of Assertion

    Direct download. The most discussed puzzle about weakness of will WoW is how it is possible: how can a person freely and intentionally perform actions that she judges she ought not perform, or that she has resolved not to perform? In this paper, we are concerned with a much less discussed puzzle about WoW?

    We explain some of the ways in which previously weak-willed agents manage to overcome their weakness.

    Some of these are relatively straightforward? But other cases are more difficult to explain: sometimes, agents with a long history of forming and then weakly abandoning resolutions manage to stick to their guns. We argue that these cases can be explained by combining George Ainslie's model of agents as multiple preference orderings competing in game theoretic interactions along with the insights of evolutionary game theory.

    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant
    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant
    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant
    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant
    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant
    The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant

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